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The fate of the UK¶s single market - the issue that 
the referendum campaigns failed to address and 
how it shaped the outcome 
 
 
Alf Young 
 
 
 
The referendum produced a blizzard of claim and counter-claim about the consequences for the Scottish 
economy of a Yes or a No vote. However one defining economic issue, it seems to me, was overlooked 
throughout on all sides. Hardly anyone chose to explore, in any depth, the fate of the United Kingdom¶s 
single market in goods and services, labour and capital, if the political union that brought it into being 
came to an end, by popular assent. 
 
Yes Scotland was at pains throughout to insist that, were there to be an in-out referendum in 2017 on 
UK membership of the European Union, the only way to preserve Scotland¶s place in Europe¶s single 
market would be to embrace independence. That implies being part of a wider, open market is vital to 
national economic success. So why did Yes have so little to say about the fate, were its campaign to 
succeed, of the much older common market Scotland currently enjoys, by being a member of the UK? 
 
The No side had plenty to say about a related economic feature of the existing union. Its shared 
currency. No hammered away at why an independent Scotland could not expect to go on using the 
pound, as part of a formal monetary union, if it chose to leave. One of the main campaigning thrusts of 
Better Together was to accuse the other side of having no Plan B. What currency an independent 
Scotland might then use. 
 
But where was Better Together¶s analysis of what a constitutional parting-of-the-ways might mean for 
one of the most potent symbols of that togetherness - the single market we all call, in its political guise, 
the UK? That common market is an order of magnitude older than its European counterpart. It has been 
three centuries in the making and is markedly more seamless in internal trading terms, labour mobility, 
investment flows and regulatory oversight than the European Economic Community, first created by its 
six core members under the Treaty of Rome in 1957, first embraced by the UK in 1973. 
 
It has been an integral part of our shared heritage across these islands since the political union of 1707. 
The UK single market has helped make us all who we are. It has shaped our industries and many of our 
careers; informed and entertained us; built and furnished our homes; shaped our urban landscape as it 
clothed and fed us. It has enabled us to save and borrow and put something aside for our old age. In 
short, for good or ill, that UK single market has touched almost every aspect of our lives. 
 
Strange then that its future received such scant attention in such a protracted campaign. A passing 
reference to the benefits of ³D borderless 8.´ featured in the first of the nineteen papers published by 
the UK government in defence of the existing union. For its part the Scottish government promised the 
³social union´ with the rest of the UK would survive us becoming independent again. We would all stay 
friends. 
  
 
 
 
 
That left a nagging question. The social union Yes wanted to perpetuate has been mediated, for so long, 
in so many ways, by the UK¶s diverse and sophisticated single market. So how could that social union 
be preserved without retaining the UK single market too? A social union also implies freedom of 
association, across national borders. It was asserted that an independent Scotland, seeking EU 
membership in its own right, would not be required to join the Schengen Area. 
 
Schengen, which Norway and Iceland participate in, requires free movement of people, without border 
checks, across national boundaries across most of the EU. The UK and Ireland are the only two member 
states currently enjoying a Schengen opt-out. Yes claimed an independent Scotland would also secure 
that opt-out, thus avoiding border controls with the rest of these islands. No insisted that an independent 
Scotland, to gain accession to the EU, would have to join Schengen. Since No prevailed neither claim 
will now be tested. So we simply do not know whether that free movement of people, such a vital 
ingredient in a social union and an essential pillar of the existing UK single market, would have survived 
independence. 
 
We  did  see,  late  on  in  the  campaign,  a  number  of  UK-wide  businesses  go  public  about  the 
consequences for them of a Yes vote. Some financial services groups, headquartered in Scotland but 
with the vast majority of their customers south of the border, signalled an intention to move their 
registered offices south. Some major retailers warned of the prospect of differential pricing of goods if 
the existing UK single market was broken up by Scottish independence. 
 
Such interventions were dismissed by Yes as further scaremongering, an extension of Project Fear. 
There was talk of boycotting companies, like Standard Life and the John Lewis Partnership, that dared 
speak out. However there was virtually no debate about the reality of border effects, however lightly 
policed, on free trade across them, especially when the status of these borders undergoes constitutional 
change. 
 
The fate of the UK single market wDVQ¶t just neglected by both sides in the referendum campaign, it was 
posted missing elsewhere too. When the leading Scottish historian Professor Sir Tom Devine came out 
as a Yes voter a month before the poll, he provided his own analysis of why the 1707 union, ³D marriage 
of convenience´ born of ³pragmatism´on both sides, had become so destabilised it was no longer fit for 
purpose. 
 
³)Uom the 1750s down to the 1980s there was stability in the relationship´ he wrote. ³1ow, though, all 
the primary foundations of that stability have gone, or have been massively diluted´ The British Empire, 
in which Scots had played such a significant role, was gone. The two great wars of the 20th century and 
the collapse of the old Soviet empire had left no ³obvious otheU´ to test our collective security. ³'inosaur 
heavy industries´ hadn¶t survived the Thatcher era. Even the ³new glue´ of the post-war welfare state 
and the creation of the NHS was not enough to save a political union past its sell-by date. 
 
Professor Devine cites ³D silent transformation of the Scottish economy´ as one of the 21st century 
realities propelling him on his journey to Yes. ³We now have an economy that can sustain itself in a 
resilient way in world markets´ he contends. ³The English and imperial markets were once a great 
seduction for Scotland, but now Europe is of great importance´ 
  
 
 
 
 
Are we really being asked to believe that that economic transformation in Scotland in the past three 
decades - one that has turned Scotland into the most prosperous per-capita part of the UK outside 
London and the south-east of England - came about despite the core significance of that UK single 
market, not, in large measure, because of it? 
 
With 70% of Scottish exports still going to the rest of the UK and non-oil exports to the continuing UK 
accounting  for  nearly  one-third  of  total  Scottish  GDP,  how  can  Professor  Devine  dismiss  English 
markets as an old seduction, now supplanted by the lure of Europe? He must know the UK is currently 
registering strong GDP growth, while eurozone economies are stalling and are stalked by the spectre of 
deflation. 
 
Nowhere in his analysis, does the long-term economic significance of the UK single market, or its fate 
were Scotland to become independent, feature. It¶s a big omission. Notably the three and a bit decades 
since 1980, in which Professor Devine claims to have detected that ³silent transformation´in Scotland¶s 
economic prospects, is precisely the period over which ScotlanG¶s two oldest banks set strategies for 
themselves that led not to resilient independence, but near-death experiences. 
 
Up until the mid 1980s Bank of Scotland (BoS) and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), like banks south of 
the border, were reluctant to embrace the competitive opportunities offered by the UK single market. 
They adhered to a commercial non-aggression pact with their English counterparts, buttressed by the 
fact that Barclays owned 35.4% of BoS while Lloyds owned 16.4% of RBS. 
 
Barclays had acquired its stake in BoS in 1971, through a deal to allow its wholly-owned subsidiary, 
British Linen Bank, to merge with Scotland¶s oldest bank. British Linen became the Bank¶s merchant 
banking arm, while Barclays retained its dominant minority shareholding in BoS until 1985. That entire 
holding was then sold on to Europe¶s largest mutual life assurance business (and the Bank¶s close 
Edinburgh neighbour), Standard Life. In 1996 Standard Life decided such a large stake in one bank 
unbalanced its equity portfolio. In a tense, politically-charged episode it sold its BoS shares to a range of 
institutional investors. 
 
Lloyds built up its stake in RBS in the late 1970s with a view to launching a full takeover bid for its 
Edinburgh rival. But it was beaten to the punch by RBS agreeing a merger with another London-based 
bank, Standard Chartered, only to find itself on the receiving end of a rival hostile offer from the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). When both these deals were thrown out by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, any prospect of Lloyds winning control of RBS evaporated too. 
 
By the end of the 1990s both Scottish banks, having escaped the clutches of English rivals, had 
themselves  turned  predator. In  1999  BoS  launched  a  hostile  bid  for  a  struggling  English  clearer, 
NatWest. When its Scottish rival, RBS, decided to bid for NatWest too and saw its offer prevail, BoS 
threw itself into a merger with the biggest demutualised building society, Halifax, creating a combined 
bank called HBOS. Emboldened by its NatWest conquest, RBS went on (in concert with two continental 
banks) to outbid Barclays for control of Dutch banking group ABN AMRO. 
  
 
 
 
 
Eight years on, as the great financial crisis broke and cash was running out, both RBS and HBOS had to 
throw themselves on the mercy of the UK Treasury. Lloyds, which in 1979 had wanted to take control of 
RBS, was prevailed upon to swallow HBOS whole. It is still digesting that meal, shedding tens of 
thousands of jobs, scraping through the latest European bank stress tests. A shrunken RBS remains 
more than 80% owned by the UK taxpayer. Two transformations certainly. But hardly welcome ones. 
Only the resilience of the UK single market kept these banks afloat. 
 
While it featured only peripherally in the referendum campaign, the historic significance of the UK single 
market and doubts about its future had Yes prevailed may still have shaped voting intentions. We doQ¶W
yet know nearly enough about why Scots voted the way they did. We know something of how patterns 
varied by age, gender and social class. We also know that many in the cohort that voted most strongly 
No, older voters, made up their minds many months before the actual vote. 
 
That group has been accused by some on the Yes side of acting out of downright selfishness. It could 
equally be argued these were the very people who, because they had lived the longest, were the most 
frustrated by a political debate that, despite its intensity, failed miserably to address intuitively-obvious 
questions from the outset. Questions like what would happen, if Scotland became independent, to the 
UK single market that had shaped so much of their own lives. 
 
As the polling analyst Professor John Curtice puts it ³In practice voters were faced with a choice 
between two uncertain futures. Nobody could be entirely sure what the economic consequences of 
independence or remaining in the Union might be. Against that backdrop we should not be surprised that 
people¶s evaluations of those consequences were influenced by their current circumstances and 
psychology´ 
 
To suggest that the fate of the UK single market may have helped determine the outcome of the Scottish 
referendum campaign is not to argue that free trading blocs like it or the more embryonic European 
single market are invested with any more historical permanence than political unions are. There are too 
many other formidable forces at work in these first decades of the 21st century. 
 
Globalisation of production. Rising income inequality. Tensions between growth agendas and those that 
prioritise wellbeing. The mismatch between the fiscal demands of nation states and tax avoidance 
strategies of global corporations. The pressures the growing digital economy, with online distribution of 
goods and services, is placing on traditional territorial models of matching supply and demand, even 
those that have embraced free trade and single markets. To name but five. If Scotland is destined to 
revisit its national question, I would hope the then state of its market relationship with the rest of these 
islands gets greater scrutiny than it did this time. But by then there will doubtless be many other great 
issues fighting for consideration. 
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